Nos. 85-2246, 85-2286.United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.
February 10, 1986.
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Frederick L. Ikenson, Washington, D.C., argued for appellant Zenith. With him on brief was J. Eric Nissley, of counsel.
Paul D. Cullen, Collier, Shannon, Rill Scott, Washington, D.C., argued for appellant IBEW. With him on brief were Paul C. Rosenthal and Lawrence J. Lasoff.
Lawrence R. Walders, Graham James, Washington, D.C., argued for certain appellees. With him on brief were H. William Tanaka and Patrick O’Leary. Thomas P. Ondeck, Baker McKenzie, Washington, D.C., for Hitachi, Rodney F. Page and Robert H. Huey, Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin Kahn, Washington, D.C., for Toshiba, Gail T. Cumins, Sharretts, Paley, Carter Blauvelt, New York City, for Sanyo, Peter J. Gartland and Robert D. Piliero, Wender, Murase White, New York City, for Sharp Electronics, Stuart M. Rosen, A. Paul Victor, Charles H. Bayar and Bret E. Suval, Weil, Gotshal Manges, New York City, for Matsushita Elec., and Brian S. Goldstein and Edward B. Ackerman, Siegel, Mandell, et al., for General Corp., etc., also on brief.
Sheila N. Ziff, Commercial Litigation Branch, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., argued for appellee U.S. With her on brief were Richard K. Willard, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., David M. Cohen, Director and Velta A. Melnbrencis, Asst. Director.
Appeal from the Court of International Trade.
Before FRIEDMAN, RICH and NIES, Circuit Judges.
NIES, Circuit Judge.
[1] The subject of this suit is a final determination of the United States Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration (ITA), under § 731 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 et seq. (1982), which assessed antidumping duties on certain television receiving sets, monochrome and color, imported from Japan.[1] Zenith and other parties to this action[2] challenged ITA’s determination by filing a civil action in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT), alleging that, because of computation errors, ITA’s determinationsPage 186
of dumping margins for various Japanese manufacturers were significantly understated. The CIT granted the government’s motion for summary judgment, thus upholding ITA’s determination, relying in part on this court’s opinion in Smith Corona Group Consumer Products Division, SCM Corp. v. United States, 713 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1022, 104 S.Ct. 1274, 79 L.Ed.2d 679 (1984). This appeal is from the final judgment of the CIT, Watson, J., reported at 606 F. Supp. 695 (1985). We affirm.
[2] Opinion
[3] In this appeal, Zenith challenges two aspects of the CIT’s decision: (1) the CIT’s holding that the exporter’s sales price (ESP) offset provision, 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c) is lawful, and (2) the CIT’s holding that the foreign market value may be adjusted by discounts and rebates which are not available to all purchasers at wholesale in the home market.
I.
[4] The validity of the ESP offset regulation was exhaustively considered by this court in Smith Corona, supra. There, the court addressed and rejected arguments comparable to those presently advanced by Zenith. In upholding the offset, this court stated:
[5] Id. at 1579. Thus, the CIT properly upheld the ESP offset in light of this precedent. This panel has considered Zenith’s attack on that aspect of the Smith Corona decision. However, even if the panel were not bound by its precedential effect, we would reach the same conclusion.[3] The decision of the CIT upholding the regulation is, therefore, affirmed.In view of the discretion accorded the Secretary under the statute to make adjustments to foreign market value, we conclude that the exporter’s sales price offset, 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c) is a proper and reasonable exercise of the Secretary’s authority to administer the statute fairly. Thus, insofar as it is challenged here, 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c) is valid.
II.
[6] Zenith next asserts that Judge Watson erred in allowing the FMV to be adjusted downward by discounts and rebates that were not offered to all purchasers at wholesale. Zenith argues that discounts and rebates are related to price, and, as a consequence, must meet the requirements of § 1677b(a)(1)(A) if they are to be used in calculating the foreign market value (FMV). Under that section, the FMV calculation begins with the price at which the goods are sold or offered for sale in the foreign market. Section 1677(14)(A) further specifies that a qualifying price must be one that was offered to all purchasers. Therefore, Zenith concludes, discounts and rebates can only enter the FMV calculation if they are available to all purchasers. The subject discounts and rebates admittedly were not offered to all. Although the CIT opined that Zenith’s interpretation of the statute is a plausible one, it correctly rejected Zenith’s argument, again, on the basis of this court’s decision in Smith Corona. On that point, it was held that discounts and rebates were properly deductible from FMV as “differences in the circumstances of sale.” Smith Corona, supra, at 1580. Under § 1677b(a)(4)(B), an adjustment arising from a difference in circumstances of sale does not depend on availability to all purchasers. See 606 F. Supp. at 701.
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of adjustments for rebates on the FMV side of the equation, Zenith maintains that the parties in that case focused only on the issue of whether the rebates were “directly related” to the sales, and did not otherwise challenge their deductability. Judge Watson was correct, however, in ruling that the question was
necessarily decided in Smith Corona. The result reached by the court is clear, and resolution of the threshold question of whether adjustments for rebates could be made under § 1677b(a)(4)(B) was a necessary predicate to the court’s analysis of the “directly related” issue. Moreover, we note that Zenith Radio Corporation (one appellant here) filed a brief as amicus curiae in the Smith Corona appeal, in which Zenith argued that the discounts or rebates there involved could not give rise to difference in circumstances of sale adjustments.[4] In any event, the issues resolved by a court are defined by the facts in the case and the law applied; they are not necessarily limited to those briefed by the parties.